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1 Strike Offender Eligible for Youth Offender Parole Hearing
In 1999, a trial court sentenced Andre Lamont Woods to a term of 25 years to life under the “One Strike” law (Penal Code § 667.61), plus a term of 57 years and 4 months. Woods was 19 years old at the time he committed his crimes.
The sentence followed a conviction from events that took place in 1998, when Woods was a passenger on a public transit bus driven by S.H. It appeared to S.H. that Woods was drunk. After all other passengers had exited the bus, Woods told S.H. to pull over the bus and “shut it down.” He said he had a knife and would kill her. Woods then raped S.H. multiple times, had her orally copulate him repeatedly, orally copulated her and put his fingers in her vagina. He then robbed her and drove the bus about a block before crashing.
In a Nutshell: A person convicted under the “One Strike Law” (addressing certain sex offenses) is now eligible for a Youth Offender Parole Hearing, if the crime was committed when that person was 25 or younger. This is a change in the law that previously made such offenders ineligible for a Youth Offender Parole Hearing.
A jury convicted him of one count of kidnapping to commit rape, two counts of forcible rape, five counts of forcible oral copulation and one count of forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object, first degree robbery, making criminal threats and unlawful taking or driving of a vehicle.
The kidnapping to commit rape charge triggered application of the One Strike law. Other sex crimes under the One Strike law include forcible rape.
In 2019, Woods petitioned the court to hold an evidence preservation proceeding pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261. On July 24, 2019, the court denied the motion on the grounds that Woods did not qualify for a Franklin proceeding because he was sentenced under the One Strike law.
On October 31, 2019, he filed a habeas corpus petition in the Long Beach Superior Court in which he argued that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The court denied the petition and Woods appealed to the Second Appellate District, which affirmed the trial court.
CA 2nd Appellate District LAAfter the Second Appellate District denied the petition, the California Supreme Court granted Woods’ petition for review and transferred the matter back to the Second Appellate District with instructions to issue an order to show cause (OSC) why Woods should not be entitled to relief on the grounds that the failure to provide him a youth offender parole hearing violates his federal constitutional rights to equal protection of the laws and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
The Second Appellate District held, in agreeing with Woods, that Penal Code § 3051(h), which excludes One Strike offenders from the procedures of the youth offender parole hearings, violated his right to equal protection of the laws because such procedures are generally available to similarly situated offenders and no rational basis existed to deny them to One Strike offenders.
The Second Appellate District consequently held that Woods was entitled to a youth offender parole hearing in his 25th year of incarceration. The court further, we think quite interestingly, commented that this ruling “renders moot Woods’ argument that his sentence [of 82 years and 4 months] violates the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.”
This article could stop right here, as the change in the law is significant enough to digest. Yet, the very reason for this article is to appreciate the reasoning behind it, so one can apply similar analysis to other legal issues.
Woods’ argument was that he is similarly situated to defendant convicted of first degree murder for purposes of equal protection analysis.
The appellate court observed that while, generally speaking, persons convicted of different crimes are not similarly situated for equal protection analysis, “there is not and cannot be an absolute rule to this effect.” People v. Hofsheier (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1185, 1199; People v. Doyle (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1266 (“there may be times . . . when offenders who commit different crimes are similarly situated for purposes of the law challenged.”). In other words, the appellate court agreed that those convicted of first degree murder are sufficiently similar to One Strike sex offenders for purposes of equal protection analysis of Penal Code § 3051.
However, to prove a violation of equal protection, it is not enough simply to show that similarly situated classes of people are treated different. Defendant must show there is no rational basis for the distinction. Here, Mr. Wood showed there was no rational basis for the different treatment and the People could offer no such reason.
We caution the reader not to celebrate too much for Mr. Woods. We suspect he will not be granted parole at his youth offender parole hearing and if he is ever released, he will be released with only a few years of life to live.
Lastly, it remains noteworthy that a person with a prior strike remains ineligible for a youth offender hearing. The appellate court did not address this except in a footnote stating that a defendant with a prior strike would present recidivism issues that a youth offender hearing is not intended to address.
The citation for the Second Appellate District Court ruling discussed above is In re Andre Lamont Woods (2nd App. Dist., 2021) 62 Cal. App. 5th 740, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d 895.
For more information about a Franklin Hearing and Youth Offender Parole Hearings, please click on the following articles:
