Being on Parole: When is a Suspicionless Search Legal?

Following his release from prison, Christian Alejandro Estrella relocated to Lakeport, California. On July 2, 2018, he visited the Lakeport Police Department (“LPD”) to register as a convicted gang member, as required by California Penal Code § 186.30.

The LPD informed Officer Tyler Trouette, LPD’s gang specialist that Mr. Estrella was on parole and was registered as a member of the Angelino Heights Sureños gang. One day later, Officer Trouette visited Mr. Estrella at his home and discussed his parole conditions. He specifically told him not to wear Oakland A’s hats, which was a sign of the Angelino Heights Sureños gang.

Ten months later, Officer Trouette was informed that Mr. Estrella had violated his parole conditions in some way.

Four months later and fourteen months after meeting Mr. Estrella in his home, Officer Trouette was on patrol. He was with Officer Ryan Cooley, patrolling Lakeport’s Armstrong Street in a marked car. They then saw Mr. Estrella standing outside his house next to a white Honda Accord. The two officers decided “to check up on him and verify that he was abiding by the terms of his parole.” The two parked and walked up to Mr. Estrella, was wearing an Oakland A’s hat.

The officers then searched Mr. Estrella and he told them he had a gun in the car. The officers found the Ruger 9mm handgun and nine rounds of ammunition in the car’s center console.

Mr. Estrella was then arrested and later charged in U.S. District Court with being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

He then filed a motion to suppress the handgun found in his car, arguing that the search was an invalid parole search and seizure under Penal Code § 3067 because Officer Trouette did not know when Mr. Estrella’s parole ended.

The Assistant U.S. Attorney assigned to the case argued that Officer Trouette has a “reasonable belief” in Estrella’s parole status due to his meeting with him, his conversation with Mr. Estrella’s parole officer, his knowledge of a recent parole violation, and his experience with the standard conditions of California parole.

The district court denied the motion, concluding that Trouette had a “reasonable belief” in Mr. Estrella’s parole status and that “this level of knowledge is sufficient” to justify a suspicionless parole seizure under Penal Code § 3067, as construed in Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 857.

Mr. Estrella then entered a guilty plea under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11(a)(2), preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was then sentenced to time served and three years of supervised release.

Mr. Estrella then appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed the trial court. The reasoning, however, is what is important to understand and is why this article is presented.

The Ninth Circuit explained that under Samson, the broad provisions of California Penal Code § 3067(b)(3), which provides that every parolee under the state’s supervision “is subject to search or seizure . . . at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant or with or without cause,” satisfies the Fourth Amendment because the state’s interest in public safety and reintegration outweigh the privacy interests of its parolees. Samson, supra, at 843, 857.

The Ninth Circuit also pointed out that parole is “an established variation on imprisonment” subject to strict monitoring and behavioral conditions.

Nevertheless, law enforcement officers do not possess unfettered discretion to detain and search suspected parolees. Two principals constrain an officer’s authority to conduct a suspicionless parole search or seizure under § 3067(b)(3). First, law enforcement must know that the subject is on active parole before initiating a search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Moreno v. Baca (9th Cir. 2005) 431 F.3d 633, 641. Second, the encounter must not violate California’s statutory prohibition on “arbitrary, capricious or harassing” searches. California Penal Code § 3067(d) (“It is not the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment.”).

Applying these standards to Mr. Estella’s search, the Ninth Circuit held that Officer Trouette’s knowledge of Estrella being on parole was “objectively reasonable,” although he did not know when Estrella’s parole end date was.

The search thereafter was not meant to harass Estrella because he was observed in violation of his parole conditions by wearing prohibited clothing and he admitted to having a firearm in the car. Therefore, his appeal was denied.