Court Reverses Governor’s Parole Denial (Van Houten)

In 2020, the Board of Parole Hearings recommended that Leslie Van Houten be released on parole. She had been serving concurrent sentences of seven years to life for the 1969 murders of Rosemary and Leno La Bianca, which she committed with other members of a cult led by Charles Manson.

This was the fourth time that the Board of Parole Hearings had recommended parole for Ms. Van Houten, and as in the prior three recommendations, Governor Gavin Newsom again reversed the Parole Board’s decision.

This time, however, Ms. Van Houten appealed the Governor’s denial to the Second Appellate District Court in Los Angeles. Surprisingly, the Second Appellate District reversed the Governor and ordered that the Board of Parole Hearings conduct its usual proceedings for Ms. Van Houten’s release on parole.

A closer look at how parole decisions are made is necessary to appreciate the significance of the Second Appellate District’s ruling.

The governing regulations provide that “a life prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of the [Board] the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to the society if released from prison.” California Code of Regulations, Title 15, § 2402(a). “The fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety,” which requires “an assessment of an inmate’s current dangerousness.” In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal. 4th 1181, 1205.

The regulations specify circumstances indicating both an inmate’s suitability and unsuitability for parole. Considerations indicating unsuitability include that the prisoner has “committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner.” Regs. § 2402(c)(1).

Factors to be considered in determining the severity of the commitment offense include where there were “multiple victims,” whether “the offense was carried out in a dispassionate and calculated manner,” whether “the victim was abused, defiled or mutilated during or after the offense,” whether the manner in which the offense was committed “demonstrates an exceptionally callous disregard for human suffering,” and whether “the motive for the crime is inexplicable or very trivial in relation to the offense.” Id.

Circumstances tending to show that the prisoner is suitable for release include that the prisoner (1) “does not have a record of assaulting others as a juvenile or committing crimes with a potential of personal harm to victims; (2) “has experienced reasonably stable relationships with others;” (3) “performed acts which tend to indicate the presence of remorse, such as attempting to repair the damage, seeking help for or relieving suffering of the victim, or indicating that he understands the nature and the magnitude of the offense;” (4) “committed his crime as a result of significant stress in his life, especially if the stress has built up over a long period of time;” (5) “at the time of the commission of the crime, the prisoner suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome . . . and it appears the criminal behavior was the result of that victimization;” (6) “lacks and significant history of violent crime;” (7) “present age reduces the probability of recidivism;” (8) “has made realistic plans for release or has developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release;” and (9) has engaged in “institutional activities [that] indicate an enhanced ability to function within the law upon release.” Regs. § 2402(d).

After the Board finds an inmate suitable for release on parole, the Governor may conduct an independent de novo review of the entire record to determine whether the inmate currently poses a threat to public safety. Cal. Const., art. V, § 8, subd. (b); In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal. 4th 192, 215.

The Governor’s decision must be based upon the same factors that restrict the Board in rendering its parole decision, but the Governor may be more stringent or cautious than the Board in deciding whether the inmate poses an unreasonable risk to the public. In re Prather (2010) 50 Cal. 4th 238, 257, fn. 12.

In this case, the Second Appellate District was required to review the Governor’s decision under the “some evidence” standard, a standard the California Supreme Court has called “extremely deferential.” In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 616, 665. Under that standard, a simple modicum of evidence is all that is required to uphold the Governor’s decision. Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal. 4th at 210.

Here, the Second Appellate District Court found that the Governor’s denial of parole based on Van Houten’s lack of explanation for the cause of her life crimes was not supported by the evidence. The Second District Court explained that Van Houten “expounded at length on the causative factors, beginning with her feelings of anger and abandonment after her parents’ divorce, a stigmatizing event in that era, and how that led to drug and alcohol abuse.”

The Second Appellate District therefore reversed the Governor’s denial of parole for Ms. Van Houten.