When a Prolonged Stop Is OK Per Fourth Amendment

The following summary concerns an arrest and conviction that took place in Nevada, but a conviction that took place in federal court and an appeal that was decided in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco. The ruling interpreted federal law on the Fourth Amendment (to the federal constitution), so it is binding on motions to suppress filed in California asking a judge to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment.

On July 10, 2020, Officers Anthony Gariano and Brandon Alvarado were patrolling in Northeast Las Vegas when they spotted a car with no license plates and no temporary registration tags.

The officers then stopped the car, which was being driven by Xzavione Taylor, who had no driver’s license or other means of identification.

Taylor explained that he had just been given the car by his aunt. He also explained that he was on parole for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Officer Gariano asked Taylor if he had any weapons on him.

After about a minute and thirty seconds into their conversation, Gariano asked Taylor to step out of the car and Taylor did so. When Taylor stepped out, Gariano could see Taylor was wearing a fanny pack across his chest and that the fanny pack was unzipped and open. It was also empty.

Based on Gariano’s and Alvarado’s experience, the two officers suspected there was a weapon that Taylor had held in the fanny pack, as it was common for people to carry a firearm in a fanny pack strapped across their chest and over one shoulder.

Alvarado and Taylor then chatted for about a minute while Gariano did a records check on Taylor. Alvarado had recognized Taylor and Taylor had recognized Alvarado from when Taylor was in prison recently and Alvarado was a guard there.

Meanwhile, Gariano did a records check and found that Taylor also had two prior convictions for grand larceny and robbery. Gariano therefore asked Taylor for consent to search the car. This was three minutes after the stop.

Taylor consented. Gariano asked if there were any guns in the car. Taylor responded, “No, sir.”

Gariano then searched the car for less than a minute and found a gun under the driver’s seat. He then placed Taylor under arrest.

A federal grand jury indicted Taylor for being a felon in possession of a handgun in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Taylor filed a motion to suppress the evidence of the gun as the fruit of an unlawful search and seizure by officers violating the Fourth Amendment by prolonging the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion and by searching the car without proper consent.

The district court denied the motion to suppress, finding that under the totality of the circumstances and in particular, Taylor’s unzipped fanny pack and that since Taylor was a felon (he told them this), officers had a reasonable suspicion to believe that Taylor was a felon in possession of a firearm, the stop was not unlawfully prolonged.

Taylor then entered a conditional plea that preserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. He was then sentenced to twenty months in federal prison and three years of supervised release.

On appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, the court of appeals affirmed the district court.

The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by reminding the reader that under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure for a traffic stop is “a relatively brief encounter,” “more analogous to a so-called Terry stop than to a formal arrest.” Rodriguez v. United States (2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354 (quoting Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U. S. 113, 117 (alterations omitted)). To be lawful, a traffic stop must be limited in its scope; an officer may “address the traffic violation that warranted the stop,” make “ordinary inquires incident to the traffic stop,” and “attend to related safety concerns.” Id., at 354-55 (quotations and alterations omitted).

The stop “may be no longer than is necessary to effectuate” these purposes and complete the traffic “mission” safely. Id. at 354-355 (first quoting Florida v. Royer (1983) 460 U.S. 491, 500 and then quoting Illinois v. Ceballes (2005) 543 U.S. 405, 407).

However, a stop “may be extended to conduct an investigation into matters other than the original traffic violation” so long as “the officers have reasonable suspicion of an independent offense.” United States v. Landeros (9th Cir., 2019) 913 F.3d 862, 867.

Here, the Ninth Circuit found the traffic stop was proper and the officers then gained reasonable suspicion that Taylor might be hiding a gun inside the car when he exited and the officers observed the unzipped fanny pack he was wearing. So the vehicle search that then followed was not part of a prolonged detention or a search without consent because Taylor did consent.

The denial of Taylor’s motion to suppress was therefore affirmed.

For more information about prolonged stops being Fourth Amendment violations, please click on the following articles: