When Criminal History is Not Neutral Basis to Exclude?

Defendant Dontrell Collins drove his car at nearly 100 miles per hour and collided into the rear of another car carrying three young women. The women’s car burst into flames and two of the three died. The third was left with serious long-term injuries and anguish.

A test of Collins’ blood revealed the presence of phencyclidine (PCP) and alcohol. His blood alcohol content at the scene through a preliminary alcohol screening (PAS) device was 0.11%, but it was 0.07% later at the police station, where he fought with a police officer.

The Kern County District Attorney charged Collins with eight crimes, including two counts of murder (because he had at least one prior DUI), Penal Code § 187; two counts of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (Penal Code § 191.5); two counts of driving while intoxicated and causing injury (Vehicle Code § 23153(a) and (b)); resisting an executive officer (Penal Code § 69); and committing a crime while in custody (Penal Code § 653.75).

The charges included enhancements for personally inflicting great bodily injury (Penal Code § 12022.7), multiple victims in an intoxicated driving case (Vehicle Code § 23558), a prison prior term (Penal Code § 667.5(b) (now removed by law)) and that Collins had suffered a prior strike conviction (Penal Code §§ 667(b) – (i), 1170.12(c) – (j)).

Collins was convicted as charged and sentenced to a term of 73 years, four months to life in prison.

On appeal, he raised four claims, but this article will only discuss his claim that the trial court judge erred in denying his motion to challenge the excusal of a black prospective juror during jury selection. Such a motion is called a Batson / Wheeler motion. Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258.

The gist of the facts relevant to the appeal on this issue was Margo S., a prospective juror who like Collins, was African American. She was one of five prospective jurors in the initial panel of 18 that were African American. In voir dire, she explained that many years ago, she got in trouble for shoplifting and was charged with the crime. Without asking any questions about whether Margo S. was left with a good or bad impression of our criminal justice system, without asking her how it even resolved, without asking her if she felt like she was treated fairly or any other questions about the experience, the prosecutor excused her.

Most telling, the prosecutor accepted seven other jurors with similar law enforcement contacts or experiences, including two who were convicted of DUI and two whose sons were charged with or convicted of DUI.

The Fifth Appellate District concluded, “clearly, Margo S.’s prior charge for petty theft had little, if anything, to do with her dismissal.”

The Fifth Appellate District came to this conclusion after a scholarly recitation of the constitutional principals and the major cases that guide voir dire, which merits sharing here for no other reason than to educate the reader.

The appellate court first pointed out that “The Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.” Foster v. Chatman (2016) 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1747.

It then moved on to the Batson / Wheeler analysis, explaining that ruling on such a motion is a three-step process. First, “a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question. Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder v. Louisiana (2008) 552 U.S. 472, 476-477.

“A defendant establishes a prima facie case of discrimination ‘by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial court to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.’ An inference is a logical conclusion based on a set of facts. When the trial court concludes that a defendant has failed to make a prima facie case, we review the voir dire of the challenged jurors to determine whether the totality of the relevant facts supports an inference of discrimination.” People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50, 74.

“Certain types of evidence [are] ‘especially relevant,’ including: ‘whether a party has struck most or all of the members of the venire from an identified group, whether a party has used a disproportionate number of strikes against members of that group, whether the party has engaged those prospective jurors in only desultory voir dire, whether the defendant is a member of that group, and whether the victim is a member of the group to which a majority of remaining jurors belong.’” People v. Rhoades (2019) 8 Cal.5th 393, 429.

Here, the prosecutor stated that he excused Margo S. due to her criminal history, which is a valid race-neutral reason, but the prosecutor’s lack of questioning of her, the appellate court found, revealed that he really excused her for an unlawful discriminatory purpose and the conviction was reversed.

This summary shows how critical it is to engage in careful voir dire.

The citation for the Fifth Appellate District Court ruling discussed above is People v. Dontrell Collins (5th App. Dist., 2021) 60 Cal. App. 5th 540, 274 Cal. Rptr. 3d 775.

For more information about voir dire issues, please click on the following articles: