Greg Hill & Associates Home
Award Recipient
Top 100 Trial Attorneys in the United States
Contact Us for a Free Consultation
Is an 11 Year Delay in SVP Trial a Due Process Violation?
In 1981, Defendant Son Tran was convicted of two counts of lewd or lascivious acting involving a child under the age of 14 (Penal Code § 288(a)).
In 1985, Mr. Tran was convicted of kidnapping for child molestation (Penal Code § 207(b)) and child molestation with a prior (Penal Code § 647(a)).
In 1986, he was convicted of forcible child molestation (Penal Code § 286(b)), assault with a deadly weapon (Penal Code § 245(a)) and false imprisonment (Penal Code § 236).
The Gist of this Article: The Second Appellate District held that the SVPA Act does not include any deadlines for a civil commitment trial of an SVP after probable cause for a civil commitment is determined.
On the eve of Mr. Tran’s release from prison, in 2008, the Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office filed a petition to civilly commit defendant under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). More than four years later, the trial court judge (Cynthia Ulfig) found probable cause that defendant was likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon release.
Nearly four years after that, in 2016, the petition was tried to a jury. The jury deadlocked, and a mistrial was declared. Two and one-half years later, in 2019, a bench retrial commenced. Finding that defendant qualified as a sexually violent predator (SVP), the trial court committed him to a state hospital for treatment and indeterminate confinement.
Mr. Tran then appealed to the Second Appellate District in downtown Los Angeles that the eleven-year span between the filing of the petition and the retrial violated his constitutional right to due process.
Court of Appeal Second Appellate District Los AngelesThe Second Appellate District Court affirmed Judge Ulfig’s ruling and denied Mr. Tran’s appeal, finding that from the very outset of the SVPA proceedings, Mr. Tran waived time and created delays that were to his benefit.
In late 2008 and early 2009, Tran, for example, filed multiple motions to strike psychologist reports heard simultaneous with the probable cause hearing. These resulted in continuances of the probable cause hearing.
Tran then filed a motion in 2010, pursuant to In re Ronje (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 509, disapproved in part by Kelly v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 641, that he was entitled to new evaluations conducted under valid protocol, to be followed by a probable cause hearing based on these evaluations. The hearing on the motion was continued several times, finally being heard in July 2010, at which time the judge granted the motion and defendant agreed to waive time to have his probable cause hearing in October 2010.
However, the new evaluation of Tran did not take place when planned and the probable cause hearing was continued to January 2011. The evaluator had more difficulty evaluating Tran and the probable cause hearing was further delayed into July 2011.
Over the next few years, there were further delays, which included for health issues of Tran’s public defender, having Tran transferred to Coalinga State Hospital and a new public defender being assigned to the case. All along, Tran agreed to further continuances in his SVP probable cause hearing and trial.
There followed objections by Mr. Tran to the evaluations being conducted in English and then later, after the interviews were conducted with an interpreter, to objections to the use of an interpreter and Tran demanding that the evaluations be conducted in English.
In reviewing Mr. Tran’s appeal of the verdict for denial of due process due to the many delays, the appellate court noted “The SVPA does not establish a deadline by which a trial on an SVP petition must be held after the trial court finds probable cause to believe the inmate is an SVP.” People v. Superior Court (Vasquez) (2018) 27 Cal.App.4th 36 (finding that a 17-year delay between the filing of an SVP petition and trial violated the due process rights to a timely trial, at 41).
Further, because an SVP trial is a civil proceeding, the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not apply. Nevertheless, “because civil commitment involves a significant deprivation of liberty, a defendant in an SVP proceeding is entitled to due process protections.” People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 209. The includes the due process right to a timely trial. In re Butler (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 614, 638.
In evaluating whether such a right has been violated, the court will apply the Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514 standards, which is a four-part test. One of the parts is to evaluate who is to blame for the delay and another part is to evaluate who benefited from the delay.
In this case, the Second Appellate Court found Mr. Tran was responsible for most of the delays and that he benefitted greatly from the delays, so there was no due process violation.
We bring this summary to the reader’s attention to point out how the appellate court looked deeper into the claim than Mr. Tran perhaps expected and the appellate court implied that Mr. Tran was trying to take advantage of his own delays to then claim unfair prejudice later from the delays, which the court saw as disingenuous.
The citation for the Second Appellate District Court ruling discussed above is People v. Son Tran (2nd App. Dist., 2021) 62 Cal. App. 5th 330, 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d 603.
For more information about SVP trial issues, please click on the following articles:
