Judge Errs in Allowing Man to Waive Right to Attorney

In some cases, defendant can be so disruptive that he or she is difficult to control, even for a judge.  The person may be mentally ill or may not respect the judicial process, or both. 

When such a defendant waives the right to counsel and seeks to represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, the exasperated judge feels some relief in realizing that granting such a request may actually help reach the end of the case and reduce the chaos.  The defendant’s arguing with his own attorney will stop and the case will move along faster. 

However, a judge must follow a two-step process to determine if a defendant really may waive the right to counsel.  The defendant first and foremost must be competent to stand trial.  Second, the judge must “satisfy itself” that defendant’s waiver of his or her “constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary.”  Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 400.

This issue and this standard was put to the test and reviewed by the California Supreme Court in People v. Billy Ray Waldon, decided on January 23, 2023.

Over a two week period in December, 1985, in San Diego County, Mr. Waldon engaged in what can only be described as a one-man crime spree, ending with his arrest.

At trial, he was charged with three counts of first-degree murder (Penal Code § 187), attempted murder (Penal Code §§ 664, 187), arson (Penal Code § 451), forcible oral copulation and sexual penetration (former Penal Code §§ 288a, 289(a)), rape (Penal Code § 261), two counts of burglary (Penal Code § 459), vehicle theft (Vehicle Code § 10851(a)), seven counts of robbery (Penal Code § 211), carrying a loaded firearm, an illegal switchblade knife and a concealed dirk or dagger (former Penal Code §§ 12031(a), 653k, 12022(a)) and two counts of animal cruelty (Penal Code § 597(a)).

Waldon represented himself at trial after the judge allowed him to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.  His defense was that federal agents framed him for all the crimes to thwart his efforts to promote world peace, spread new languages and advance Cherokee autonomy.

Waldon testified that his grandfather was part Cherokee and that after Waldon discharged from the Navy in 1984, he founded the Cherokee Bicycle Company to benefit the Cherokee people.  The gist of his defense was a series of convoluted stories that involved his being repeatedly kidnapped by federal agents and escaping, only to be kidnapped again.

However, there were several eyewitnesses who identified Waldon at the scene of many of the crimes.

The jury then returned a verdict of death.

Waldon’s appeal was automatic to the California Supreme Court. 

In his appeal, he argued that the judge erred in granting his request to waive his right to counsel and represent himself.  The California Supreme Court agreed.

Our state’s highest court explained that before trial started, Waldon made a motion to represent himself under Faretta, supra.  Judge Zumwalt heard the motion and denied it, finding that Waldon had a mental disorder that prevented him from rationally perceiving his circumstances, appreciating the risks and consequences of self-representation, and appropriately formulating and presenting a defense. 

Judge Zumwalt had ordered a psychiatric examination to assess Waldon’s capacity to waive counsel.  The psychiatrist who conducted the examination, Dr. Kalish, concluded that Waldon did not appreciate the ramifications of waiving counsel and likely had a delusional thought disorder.  Two other psychiatrists, Dr. Di Francesca and Dr. Koshkarian, also testified that Waldon was unable to contemplate potential defenses or the implications of proceeding without counsel.

A little over a year later, Waldon filed a second Faretta motion before a different judge, Judge Boyle.  Judge Boyle granted the motion without considering Judge Zumwalt’s denial or the evidence upon which it was based.  The California Supreme Court found that this was an abuse of discretion.

The Supreme Court found fault with Judge Boyle’s ruling, finding that he failed to make a careful inquiry into Waldon’s competence, including consideration of psychiatric evidence.  Moreover, Judge Boyle only spoke briefly with Waldon and his basic inquiry was insufficient to establish his understanding of the dangers of self-representation.

The verdict was thus reversed and the case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings, which likely means another trial.

For more information about the right to represent oneself, please click on the following articles: