Ninth Circuit Overturns State Court Death Sentence

In the summer of 1988, Tauno Waidla murdered Viivi Piirisild in the North Hollywood home she shared with her husband, Avo Piirisild.  The Piirisilds had kindly provided Mr. Waidla a home after he emigrated to the United States from Estonia. 

The Piirisilds were also from Estonia, having come to the United States in 1951, and were active in the Baltic American Freedom League, which helped emigrants from the Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.

Mr. Waidla used a hatchet and a hammer to kill Ms. Piirisild and, in the course of killing her, also robbed her and burglarized her house.

Mr. Waidla did so with the help of a co-conspirator, Peter Sakarias.  They had both served in the Russian Army and deserted into West Germany and eventually flying into New York City and later, coming to Los Angeles. 

In November 1988, the Los Angeles County District Attorney’s office filed a criminal complaint against Mr. Sakarias and a separate similar complaint against Mr. Sakarias.  Each complaint alleged a felony murder theory of liability due to the robbery and burglary that took place during the murder.  The Los Angeles Superior Court jury convicted Mr. Waidla and voted in favor of the death penalty.

In the year of 2000, the California Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence. People v. Tauno Waidla (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 690. 

After the California Supreme Court affirmed the ruling, Mr. Waidla appealed his death sentence in federal court in Tauno Waidla v. Ron Davis, Warden, et al., by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.  At the U.S. District Court level, now-retired judge Andrew J. Guilford granted habeas relief for the sentencing phase, based on Waidla’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

Ron Davis, et al., then appealed judge Guilford’s ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pasadena, which affirmed judge Guilford’s ruling, although in a split panel ruling, overturning Waidla’s death sentence.  However, the panel affirmed his conviction.

The Ninth Circuit panel found that the California Supreme Court, which had unanimously affirmed the conviction and the death sentence, could not have reasonably found that defense counsel’s failures were non-prejudicial to Waidla.

This ruling is extremely significant, we believe, because the Ninth Circuit almost never overturns a state court death sentence.  So, when it does so, it is valuable to look at the reasoning used.

First, however, one should know that Waidla argued three categories of mitigation evidence could have been presented, but was not: (1) evidence of his psychosocial history and character; (2) evidence of the abuse faced by Estonians serving in the Soviet Army; and (3) evidence that he had behaved well in custody prior to trial.

Mr. Waidla also argued that his attorney was ineffective because he failed to strongly litigate a motion to suppress his confession, counseled Waidla to recant his confession and instead testify to an alibi; failing to investigate alternative defenses; and failing to rebut the state’s expert testimony regarding the lifespan of fingerprints.

What seems most significant to us is that the Ninth Circuit explained that it took the jury nine days of deliberation and two bouts of deadlock to reach a verdict.  The Ninth Circuit commented on this that “No fair minded jurist considering a jury so closely divided could discount the prejudicial effect of failing to present even modest evidence of Waidla’s background and good character . . . Had the three categories of evidence that counsel should have discovered been presented to the jury, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have voted against the death penalty.”

The Ninth Circuit pointed also to a doctor’s report Waidla had prepared for the appeal that a doctor determined Waidla was a non-violent, non-confrontational individual who exhibited “fewer risk factors to violence than any individual she had ever examined.”

What we at Greg Hill & Associates take away from this ruling is that defense counsel must seek court appointment of a mitigation expert to investigate such psychosocial history information and not overlook the fact, if true, that defendant behaved well in custody prior to trial.