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Voluntary Manslaughter if Man Shoots Cop 30 Times?
On the night of June 11, 1999, Maurice Gerald Steskal was seen near the residence of his wife, Nannette, from whom he had separated. Close to midnight, a neighbor heard a commotion near the apartment where Nannette lived and then saw Steskal outside smashing furniture against a wall, while screaming he hated everyone in the world. The neighbor tried to calm him down, but Steskal refused, saying “I have guns; I have ammunition.”
In a Nutshell: It was not error for a judge to refuse a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter when there was not substantial evidence supporting such an alternative theory of liability, as here there was not.
Just after midnight, Steskal went into a 7-Eleven carrying a semiautomatic rifle. As he purchased cigarettes, he asked the clerk if she was afraid of the gun and told her it was to protect himself from the “fucking law.”
An Orange County Sheriff’s deputy, Bradley Riches, drove by the 7-Eleven and saw Steskal inside with his rifle. Riches then stopped, but not before alerting other deputies by radio. As Steskal walked out of the 7-Eleven, Riches drove into the 7-Eleven parking lot with his overhead lights activated.
The 7-Eleven clerk then watched as Steskal walked out of the store and immediately began firing his rifle. He shot Deputy Riches thirty times at close range, then returned to his car and drove away. Riches was still seat-belted in his car, but it appeared he had tried to unholster his gun. He died at the scene.
Orange County Sheriffs deputies apprehended Steskal a few hours later. In his car, they found the disassembled rifle and over 100 round of ammunition. A blood screen found no drugs or alcohol in his system.
Sheriffs had encountered Steskal a few other times in the past few months. In one encounter, he had been pulled over for a traffic violation and pounded on his steering wheel in anger. Police later arrested him for a small amount of marijuana and resisting an officer in the performance of his official duties (Penal Code § 148(a)(1)).
At trial for the first-degree murder of Officer Riches, Steskal did not deny shooting Steskal, but claimed he was acting under a delusional fear when it occurred. Steskal’s sister and a variety of acquaintances testified that Steskal had been paranoid for many years and was particularly occupied by thoughts that law enforcement and government actors were following him and wished him harm. He slept with an assault rifle. He believed his wife’s apartment was wiretapped and felt he was being monitored through her television. He also was physically abused by his parents.
The jury found Steskal guilty of first-degree murder, Penal Code § 187, and found true the special circumstance that Steskal intentionally killed a peace officer engaged in the performance of his duties, Penal Code § 190.2(a)(7), as well as the allegation that he personally used a firearm in the commission of the offense, Penal Code §§ 12022.53(a) and 12022.53(d).
The jury returned a verdict of death.
On his automatic appeal to the Supreme Court of California, Steskal argued that the trial court judge erred by denying an imperfect self-defense and voluntary manslaughter jury instruction, arguing he actually, but unreasonably believed he had to shoot Deputy Riches in order to defend himself. The trial court judge had denied the request because it was not supported by the evidence. After all, “a trial court must instruct on all lesser included offenses supported by substantial evidence.” People v. Vargas (2020) 9 Cal. 5th 793, 827 (instruction on a lesser included offense “is not required when the evidence supporting such an instruction is weak.”).
The California Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. It explained that “[I]mperfect self-defense, which reduces murder to voluntary manslaughter, arises when a defendant acts in the actual but unreasonable belief that he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.” People v. Duff (2014) 58 Cal. 4th 527, 561.
In this case, Steskal did not present evidence of his alleged ongoing fear of law enforcement and the possibility he experienced a “fight or flight” response to seeing Deputy Riches in his vehicle. Moreover, Steskal did not present substantial evidence that he perceived Riches as placing Steskal at “risk of imminent peril” that Steskal could meet only through the use of deadly force. People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal. 5th 98, 133.
Moreover, the circumstances of the crime suggest Steskal was the aggressor in the confrontation with Riches, not the other way around.
Consequently, the California Supreme Court found that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the jury such instructions.
We present this article to emphasize the need to present substantial evidence of defendant’s belief that he or she believed self defense was necessary if one faces a murder charge and he or she seeks a voluntary manslaughter resolution instead.
The citation for the California Supreme Court ruling discussed above is People v. Maurice Gerard Steskal (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 332, 277 Cal. Rptr. 3d 604, 485 P. 3d 1.
For more information about voluntary manslaughter, please click on the following articles:
