What is a Napue Violation by the Prosecution?

Marie Caton and Louis Freiri were attacked at Caton’s Fresno residence in November 1988.  Caton had been beaten and suffered multiple stab wounds.  She died of her injuries eleven days later.  Freiri died from stab wounds at the scene.  The murders went unsolved for many months.

Several months later, Richard Buchanan saw a flyer at a convenience store announcing that Caton’s relatives were offering a $5,000 reward for information leading to conviction of the perpetrator of the murders.  Mr. Buchanan reached out to the store owner and gave him his name, telling the store clerk, “I really could use this money.” 

Detective Doug Stokes then contacted Mr. Buchanan, who identified Colin Baker Dickey as being involved in the murders.

An investigation of Dickey proceeded and he was eventually tried and convicted of murder in Fresno Superior Court in1991.  The jury sentenced him to death after also convicting him of robbery and burglary.

Mr. Dickey filed a motion for a new trial and to modify the verdict, arguing that testimony from Mr. Buchanan, the State’s “star witness,” was false insofar in many ways and that the prosecutor deliberately elicited such testimony and then failed to correct the false and misleading testimony. 

The key testimony that was false was Buchanan’s testimony that the prosecutor’s office did not offer him any favors for his testimony at trial and further, that Mr. Buchanan only met with a certain detective “a few times” prior to trial.  The prosecutor then went on to exploit Buchanan’s false testimony in his closing argument, in violation of Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264. 

The prosecution also failed to produce evidence to the defense that would have seriously impeached Buchanan’s testimony, in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83. 

Most critically, to obtain the death penalty, the State was required to prove special circumstances, and the State’s special circumstance evidence depended on Buchanan’s testimony.  The prosecutor knew this and recognized the jury would have ample reason to doubt Buchanan.  So, to shore up Buchanan’s testimony, the prosecutor asked the judge to read aloud a California statute that put Buchanan on notice that he would subject himself to the death penalty if he lied under oath and Dickey was wrongfully convicted and executed.  What the jury did not know – because the prosecutor did not correct the false testimony – was that Buchanan did lie to them under oath, even given the potential consequences for doing so in a capital case.

Mr. Dickey appealed the verdict all the way to the California Supreme Court, which ruled that while Buchanan’s testimony at trial was indeed false, it was not material and that the jury still would have returned the same verdict.

Mr. Dickey then appealed the same issue in a writ for petition of habeas corpus in federal court, eventually reaching, in Colin Baker Dickey v. Ronald Davis, Warden, San Quentin State Prison, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Pasadena.

The Ninth Circuit agreed with Mr. Dickey and reversed and remanded the case with instructions to vacate the special circumstance findings and the death penalty.

In reaching this ruling, the Ninth Circuit explained what a “Napue Violation” is, which is why this article is written for our readers.

The Ninth Circuit explained that “for nearly ninety years, it has been established Supreme Court precedent that a conviction violates due process if it is obtained through knowing presentation of perjured testimony.  See Mooney v. Holohan (1935) 294 U.S. 102, 112-113.

In Napue, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a prosecutor’s failure to correct a materially false impression also violates due process, making a conviction thereafter invalid, regardless of whether the State intentionally solicited the false evidence or testimony.  See Napue, at 269-270.  Doing so makes the conviction tainted.  The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that the introduction of false testimony is corrosive to the “truth-seeking function” of our adversarial system.  United States v. Agurs (1976) 427 U.S. 97, 103-140.

To prevail on a Napue claim, Mr. Dickey had to prove: “(1) testimony (or evidence) was actually false; and (2) the prosecution knew or should have known that the testimony was actually false; and (3) the false testimony was material.”  Hayes v. Brown (9th Cir. 2005) 399 F. 3d 972, 984.

The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the materiality analysis for a Napue violation requires that a conviction “must be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.”  Agurs, supra, at 103-104 (emphasis added).

Here, the Ninth Circuit found Buchanan’s testimony was material, so the death sentence and special circumstance finding was reverse and the case was remanded for further proceedings.

While it is not noted in this opinion, we hope the prosecutor is no longer employed as an attorney to remove him or her from any opportunity to repeat such fatal misconduct and to protect the public.