Equal Protection Violated by One Strike Law?

In making sentencing laws, the Legislature of the State of California considers protecting public safety by evaluating recidivism statistics on what types of criminal offenders are most likely to reoffend.  At the top of the list consistently are sex offenders who commit the most serious sex offenses, often with violence, which study after study have agreed have high recidivism rates and are the least likely to be cured and are the most likely to reoffend.

Taking this concern for recidivism into account, the Legislature has excluded certain types of sex offenders for early parole consideration.  The One Strike Law reflects this by mandating imprisonment for 15 years to life, 25 years to life or Life Without the Possibility of Parole (LWOP) at Penal Code §§ 667.61(a), (b), (j), (l) and (m).

While other sex offenders face certain sentences, those who commit certain enumerated sex offenses face potential life sentences, clearly showing disparate treatment.  But is such disparate treatment unconstitutional?

The case of Carlos Alfonso Bolanos raised this issue recently at the Fifth Appellate District. 

When Mr. Bolanos was 22 years old, he committed various sex crimes that for which he was sentenced to serve multiple life in prison, without parole, and multiple life in prison, with parole, terms.  These sentences were based on the One Strike Law.

The crimes included forcible rape (Penal Code § 261(a)), forcible oral copulation of a minor (Penal Code § 287(c)(2)((C)), aggravated kidnapping (Penal Code § 209(b)), criminal threats (Penal Code § 422(a)), false imprisonment (Penal Code § 236) and grand theft automobile (Penal Code § 484 / 487(d)(1)).  There were three victims. 

Mr. Bolanos appealed his convictions and sentencing on several grounds, but this article’s scope will be limited to his claim that the youthful offender parole scheme, which excludes people sentenced under the One Strike Law and people sentenced to LWOP for crimes committed as adults, violates equal protection. 

The Fifth Appellate District Court rejected Bolanos’ arguments.  This article is written to explain why.

The first step is in the equal protection analysis is to evaluate whether there is a classification based on a suspect class or whether the right at issue is a fundamental right.  Two types of criminals are not suspect classes of people because they are not classifications based on gender, religious preference, national origin, etc.  They are just two types of criminals.  Second, parole is not a fundamental right like freedom of speed, religion, the ability to make a living, travel between states or associate with others, etc.

Then the court must evaluate whether the state adopted a classification affecting two or more people that are similarly situated in an unequal manner.  If the court finds that the two groups are similarly situated in all material aspects, the court must consider whether the challenged classification ultimately has a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose.

A classification in a statute is presumed to be rational until the challenger shows that no rational basis for unequal treatment is reasonably conceivable.

First, relative to the One Strike exclusion from a youth offender parole hearing, the court assumed people sentenced under the One Strike law are similarly situated to all offenders eligible for youth offender parole.  However, the disparate treatment under the One Strike law exclusion is supported by a concern for recidivism.  People v. Miranda (2021) 62 Cal. App. 5th 162, 186 (“drawing a line at recidivism is neither arbitrary nor irrational”); accord People v. Mosely (2021) 59 Cal. App. 5th 1160, 1170.

Turning to the LWOP as an adult-only exclusion, the Fifth Circuit noted that this equal protection argument has been asserted many times already and no court has found it is an equal protection violation.  See e.g., People v. Sands (2021) 70 Cal. App. 5th 193, 204 (“The Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders with the same sentence (life without parole) based on their age.”). 

Most recently, the Second Appellate District (covering Los Angeles County cases) recognized that the Legislature acted rationally in deciding that individuals sentenced to life without parole for a special-circumstance murder committed while still a minor (16 or 17 years old) were entitled to a youth offender parole hearing but young adults who committed the same offense after turning 18 were not.” People v. Hardin (2022) 84 Cal. App. 5th 273, 278, review granted Jan. 11, 2023, S2777487.

In other words, both of Bolanos’ equal protection claims were denied rather easily by the Fifth Circuit.

For more information about equal protection issues, please click on the following articles: